The “political compass” meme is a bourgeois oversimplification that attempts to reduce the complex, scientific analysis of class struggle to a two-dimensional graph.

It serves to obfuscate the true nature of political ideology, which is defined not by abstract “libertarian” or “authoritarian” labels, but by one’s relationship to the means of production and their stance on the dictatorship of the proletariat.

By placing Marxism-Leninism in the so-called “authoritarian left” quadrant, it slanders the revolutionary and democratic essence of the vanguard party and the necessary period of socialist construction, which is the highest form of democracy for the working class.

This framework is idealist and anti-dialectical, designed to discredit the scientific and proven path of socialist revolution by equating it with reactionary fascism.

The phrase “Russians came and stole everything” is a harmful generalization attributing collective guilt to the entire nation.

The comment does not specify either a time frame or specific historical events, which makes an assessment impossible. The text is clearly ideological in nature, not historical, which makes it difficult to evaluate it objectively.

Relations between countries (including Russia, China, Austria, and others) are complex multidimensional processes that cannot be reduced to simplistic images of “victims” and “aggressors.”

I am surprised of the fact that nobody wrote neoclassical economics

Your comment contains several historical inaccuracies and simplifications:

1. Modern Austria as a state did not exist during the Napoleonic Wars, when Russia participated in anti-French coalitions. The Austrian Empire was then an active participant in the events.

2. During World War II, Austria was annexed by Nazi Germany in 1938 (the Anschluss) and effectively became part of the German state until 1945.

3. The term “Russia invaded Europe” is an oversimplification. The Russian Empire and the USSR participated in pan-European conflicts, but usually as part of coalitions and with specific political goals.

A more accurate historical position could reflect:

• Neutral status of Austria after 1955
• Austria’s participation in pan-European institutions
• The complex history of relations between the Russian/Soviet state and European countries

I recommend avoiding simplistic interpretations of complex historical processes and interstate relations.

Mold, which can live even in space, or under very strong electromagnetic radiation

I think that you can start solving exercises on HackerRank or Exercism

The text also opened the door to a reintroduction of compulsory enlistment.

Just as tasting food mindfully teaches you to distinguish its flavors and ingredients, engaging in activities you enjoy teaches you to relax and appreciate them more deeply.

There is a lot of left-leaning content available in French! They have a lot of scholars and thinkers who are openly leftists, and in Europe it will not scare anyone.

One source I found is this: https://edition.cnn.com/2025/08/22/americas/cuba-crisis-energy-economy-intl-latam

It was translated in Italian and shared by several Italian news outlets.

The article I shared is about Liberal-Idealist paradigm in geopolitics, which is a very specific topic. However, let’s analyze your claims.

According to polls conducted by the Levada Center (an independent sociological institution recognized in Russia as a “foreign agent”), only about 16% of Russians support the Western model of democracy, while 50% advocate a “special Russian democracy,” which in practice often serves as a camouflage for authoritarianism. At the same time, only 5% believe that Russia does not need democracy at all.

However, low turnout in elections (for example, 48% in the 2016 State Duma elections) and indifference to formal institutions of power do not mean a rejection of democratic ideals as such. Many citizens do not see the connection between democracy and solving pressing problems (poverty, corruption, unemployment). In addition, state propaganda successfully creates the image of a “besieged fortress,” where democracy is associated with vulnerability to external threats.

The majority of Russians want not so much Western-style liberal democracy as social stability, justice, and respect for basic rights. Democratic institutions are perceived as a tool, not as a value in itself.

In Russia, “liberals” refer to supporters of the Western model of democracy, market economy, human rights, and pro-Western foreign policy. They are often accused of lacking patriotism and blindly copying foreign designs. In the United States, “conservatives” (especially of the libertarian persuasion) also advocate limiting the state, low taxes, and individual freedoms: for values that in Russia are associated with liberalism.

However, this similarity is superficial. American conservatism includes a strong component of religious traditionalism, support for a strong army, and anti-communism, which is unusual for Russian liberals. In addition, Russian “liberals” often advocate social guarantees and the role of the state in the economy, which brings them closer to American social liberals.

There is irony, but it is conditioned by a different historical and cultural context. In Russia, where the traditions of individualism and a limited state are weak, liberalism is perceived as alien and “Western,” while in the United States the same ideas are part of the conservative mainstream.

After 2014, Ukraine adopted a number of laws restricting the public sphere of the Russian language:

• In 2016-2017, language quotas were introduced on television and radio (up to 75% of content in Ukrainian), which reduced the presence of the Russian language in the media.
• In 2018, the Constitutional Court of Ukraine repealed the 2012 law “On the Fundamentals of State Language Policy” (known as the Kivalov-Kolesnichenko Act), which gave Russian the status of a regional language in areas with more than 10% of native speakers.
• The law “On Ensuring the Functioning of the Ukrainian Language as the State Language” adopted in 2019 tightened the requirements for the use of Ukrainian in education, public services and the public sphere.

There was no direct ban on private use, but systemic restrictions in the public space raised concerns among Russian-speaking citizens about the future of their linguistic identity.

There are many issues with your comment.

“Putin had no problems in 2004” is incorrect. Russia’s reaction to the expansion of NATO in 2004 was immediate, harsh, and contained threats of specific counter-measures.

“In 2007, he suddenly got scared” is an incorrect interpretation. The Munich Speech of 2007 was not a sudden reaction of fear, but a thoughtful, ideological and strategic statement by a strengthened Russia. It marked the transition to a tougher and more independent foreign policy course based on rejection of American hegemony and an insistence on taking into account Russian security interests.

The rhetorical escalation was not the result of a sudden emotion, but the result of the accumulation of systemic contradictions, the unwillingness of the West to take into account Moscow’s concerns and the strengthening of Russia, which was ready to challenge the status quo that did not suit it.

Maybe from superhero movies or videogames

The standard liberal counterargument is that NATO is a voluntary defensive alliance operating on the basis of consensus. Article 5 of the Washington Treaty is only really activated in the event of an attack on one of the members.

However, this argument is unconvincing for Russia for several reasons:

• Past experience, as NATO’s military operations in Yugoslavia (1999) without a UN mandate were perceived in Moscow as proof that the alliance could act offensively outside its territory.
• Changing doctrines, as knowledge of the evolution of NATO’s doctrines after the Cold War, including operations outside the territory of the participating countries, allows Russia to assert that the initially defensive nature of the alliance has changed.
• Missile defense system, because the deployment of the American missile defense system in Eastern Europe, although claimed as protection against the threat from Iran, is perceived by Moscow as part of an offensive strategic potential that undermines its nuclear deterrent.

Your thesis is impeccable from the point of view of international law and the normative (liberal) theory of international relations. It accurately identifies violations and tactics.

However, for a complete geopolitical picture, it must be supplemented by an analysis of the motives and strategic calculations of the other side (Russia), which, even if illegal, are the driving force of its actions.

Legal assessment and assessment from a position of strength are often in conflict, which is the essence of the modern geopolitical conflict.

Your comment is a prime example of the clash between two paradigms in understanding international relations:

• The Liberal-Idealist Paradigm, where conflicts arise from the violation of universal norms and rights. The solution is to isolate the aggressor, punish it, and support the victim. Morality and law are the main guiding principles. The comment is written from this perspective.

• The Realist Paradigm, from Classical Geopolitics, where international relations are an anarchic environment where states rationally (though sometimes erroneously) pursue their national interests based on security, power, and influence. From this viewpoint, moral assessments are useless for analysis; one must study the balance of power, geography, interests, and perceived threats.

You made a morally powerful but analytically poor statement. It accurately reflects the emotional mood of a significant part of the international community and serves as an important reminder of the human dimension of the conflict. However, as a tool for understanding what is happening and forecasting future events, it is useless and even harmful, as it calls for the abandonment of critical analysis in favor of pure moralizing. The task of a geopolitical expert is to synthesize both approaches: to be fully aware of the monstrous nature of events, while also coldly and rationally analyzing the mechanisms driving them.

Maybe Al Jazeera could be a more balanced source on this topic, for example: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/8/22/russia-ukraine-war-list-of-key-events-day-1275

This is a solid point but it kinda misses how fast things are changing. It’s totally true that solar started as a rich person’s backup generator, but that’s not the whole story anymore. The real shift is happening off-grid in developing countries. Places in Ethiopia and Nigeria are seeing solar become the main power source for entire villages, not just a backup, and it’s actually kickstarting local economies.

Also, the energy transition in Africa is way more complex than just connecting homes to the grid. A lot of people who are technically connected can’t even afford to use the power or it’s so unreliable they still use wood. The real opportunity is that renewables could actually drive massive development, like in Kenya and Morocco. The huge problem, though, is the insane lack of funding and the structural barriers holding everything back. They get almost none of the global investment needed to make this happen.

Your comment represents an emotional analogy rather than an analytical assessment. While such a metaphor may reflect someone’s subjective feelings, it is unsuitable for analyzing a complex geopolitical situation.

Russia is not a “schoolyard bully,” but a sovereign state with a centuries-old history, complex political processes, and a multifaceted foreign policy. Its actions on the international stage are based on specific national interests, security considerations, and historical context.

Oversimplified analogies that reduce complex international relations to schoolyard conflicts do not contribute to constructive dialogue or an understanding of real geopolitical dynamics.